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Lawyers, Politics, and the "Lawyers' Interest": 
An Historical Inquiry 
By James W. Gordon* 
I. Introduction 
Lawyers have been associated more routinely with politics in the 
United States than has any other occupational group. • It has become 
a truism that the bar has wielded an unequaled influence on the character 
of our political institutions and upon our public policies. The nature 
of this influence and the purposes to which it has been put deserve 
more attention from legal historians than they have to date received. 
Critics of the profession have often expressed their opinion that, 
in the lexicon of Eighteenth century politics, lawyers form an "interest" 
whose members' course in public life reflects a demonstrable identity 
and allegiance. In the view of such commentators, the bar's political 
influence has been self-serving and pernicious. Such was the opinion 
of the author of a letter which appeared in a prominent Democratic 
newspaper in Kentucky in 1849. The correspondent, who signed his 
letter "Jefferson," cited a venomous contemporary indictment of 
lawyers which he referred to as The Political Guide, 2 in support of 
his views. Lawyers, he wrote, were the worst possible choice for political 
leaders: 
• Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 
B.A . 1971, University of Louisville; J.D . 1974, Ph.D . 1981 , University of Kentucky. 
The author would like to express his appreciation to Howard I. Kalodner, Dean of 
Western New England College School of Law, for supporting this and other projects 
with grants of summer research funds. 
1. See, e.g., J . HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 
352-56 (1950); Shepherd, Lawyers Look at Themselves: Professional Consciousness 
and the Virginia Bar, 1770-1850, 25 AM. J . LEGAL HtsT. 1 (1981); Broman, Lawyers 
in Politics: An Exploratory Study ofthe Wisconsin Bar, 1968 Wts. L . REv. 75 1 (1968); 
E. BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS, AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 17 (1948); Metcalf, 
The Profession in the Political History of the United States, 16 YALE L .J . 183 (1907); 
Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1934); McBride, The 
Position and Influence of the Lawyer in American History, 51 AM. L. REv. 462 (1923); 
H. EULAU & J . SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN POLITICS, A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL CON­
VERGENCE (1964) . 
2. Kentucky Yeoman (Frankfort), May 24, 1849, at 1, col. 1. The Yeoman 
was one of the two most important Democratic newspapers in the State at mid-century, 
and a mouthpiece for the leadership of that Party. It has proved impossible to obtain 
a copy of The Political Guide. The only information given by "Jefferson" about it, 
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[They] .. . are interested in keepjng the people ignorant, vicious, 
contentious, cdminal and embarrassed. For the embarrassments, 
ignorance, vkes and crimes of the people, have a tendency to pro­
duce litigation, and litigation is the favorite element of the lawyer; 
it is the very heaven in whlch he delights to dwell. 3 
For "Jefferson" it was clear that lawyers used their public positions 
to promote their individual and group interests to the detriment of 
society at large-lawyer politicians furthered the "lawyers' interest. " 
These statements alone would warrant empirical investigation but 
other writers have added additional features to the portrait of the bar 
which also deserve evaluation. The profile of "interest" is completed 
by the assertion that lawyers have been so closely identified with par­
ticular substantive policies or have had such an affinity for particular 
groups, that one can point out in advance the lawyers' side on many 
important questions of public policy. Alexis de Tocqueville, in describing 
the impact of lawyers on America in his masterpiece Democracy in 
America, 4 ascribed to the bar "aristocratic propensities" and 
characterized it as among the anti-democratic elements of American 
society. In addition, he associated it with the commercial interest. ~ 
Others have also suggested that lawyers were commerCial-minded or 
associated with specific elites. 6 
The assumption that the occupational identification " lawyer" is 
the saHent feature in evaluating polhical motivation is itself interesting, 
if questionable. Does occupational identity overwhelm other identities? 
Are politically active lawyers really a homogeneous group? Are they 
less affected by competing identities associated with wealth, geography, 
familial and constituency concerns, political ideology, party considera­
tions, or any of the myriad other sources of public and private motiva­
tion of behavior? Surely the hypothesis that politically active lawyers 
behave differently from nonlawyers is worth investigating. 
This paper offers some preliminary responses to the questions posed 
other than his version of the title, is that it was published "but recently." He also 
gives page references which suggest that the Guide was of book length. 
3. /d. 
4. 4th ed. (Henry Reeve trans. 1841). 
5. See Newmyer, Daniel Webster as Tocquevil/e's Lawyer: The Dartmouth 
College Case Again, 11 AM . J. LEGAL HIST. 127 (1967). For one interesting response 
to Tocqueville see Minor, The Legal Profession, 13 S. & W. LITERARY MESSENGER 
& REVIEW 356, 358 (June 1847). 
6. See, e.g., M. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1780-1860 at 140-59 (1977). 
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above. These responses are grounded in empirical research. They are 
tentative because my research is continuing on a broader data base. 
The completed first stage of the project, with which this article 
is concerned, entailed the intensive examination of the behavior of 
lawyers in a self-contained legislative body. One was sought in which 
major public issues would be debated in full public view and with suf­
ficient notoriety to assure the preservation of complete records. It was 
also important that it be a body which appeared representative of other 
such bodies, and one populated by a reasonably representative group 
of lawyers-that is, a body which would not necessarily attract only 
the most prominent and political members of the profession. It also 
seemed best to look at a time and place which had not been explored 
often before and which was away from the commercial centers of the 
East coast. The state constitutional convention held in Kentucky in 
1849 fulfilled all of these requirements. 
As a research universe this convention was attractive because it 
was sufficiently public, sufficiently important-yet not too important­
sufficiently documented , and sufficiently representative, to be worth 
studying. 7 Of equal importance, it met close enough in time to the 
compilation of the 1856 federal c~nsus to permit the use of census data 
in reconstructing the contemporary state bar . In this way, meaningful 
comparisons between lawyers inside the convention and those in the 
state at large would be possible. Having found a suitable forum, all 
that was necessary was to set about the task of testing the charge that 
political lawyers routinely traded principle for interest. 
Did the lawyer delegates work together, act together, vote together? 
Did they exhibit any of the cohesiveness ascribed to them by critics? 
Did they display a common attachment to any identifiable views which 
differentiated them from nonlawyers called upon to make the same 
decisions on matters of major public concern? 
Evidence drawn from the published debates of the convention­
most importantly the roll call votes reported there-when filtered 
through personal data on the delegates, suggests that the answers to 
these questions was no. The hypothesis that a "lawyers' interest" existed 
and that members of the profession tailored their public positions on 
7. See HURST, supra note 1, at 204-46. See also F. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860: A STUDY IN THE EVOLU­
TION OF DEMOCRACY (1930, reprint 1966) (constitutional developments in Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia are fully treated and reveal 
many parallels to Kentucky). 
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substantive questions to it , is not supported by a careful examination 
of the Kentucky case. 8 
II. Some Words on Methodology 
The two best indicators of political behavior available to historians 
are what people did and what they and their contemporaries said or 
wrote about what they did. Until the 1960's historians tended to 
emphasize what people said about their intentions rather than what 
they did. This was more a result of the nature of the available sources 
and methods of analysis than of conscious choice. It was only with 
the technological advances which produced microfilm recordation, 
(which made census schedules, tax records, and similar sources widely 
available), and the computer (which made manipulation of such material 
possible), that historians became aware of the richness of materials 
previously left largely unexplored . A revolution in the analytical 
methodology of History's sister disciplines of Sociology, Psychology, 
and Political Science, emphasizing the use of statistics- which paralleled 
the revolution in the availability of broad based , descriptive historical 
data-has resulted in the rise of quantitative history. Although I am 
not prepared to argue that quantitative methods give a "truer" view 
of history than more conventional methodologies, I would suggest that 
8. There are some obvious dangers inherent in generalizing on the basis of 
research limited to one community of political lawyers . As seems often the case, an 
investigator must choose between breadth and depth of coverage. In the present case, 
l elected depth in order to use regression analysis, a powerful interpretive tool; others, 
in hoped-for futu re investigations, may make a different choice. If there is one over­
arching reality about nineteenth century America which researchers can ignore only 
at their peril, it is that we are not examining one community, but many. If the Ken­
tucky environment is not representative of all of them, there is reason to believe it 
representative of some of them. Kentucky politics and the Kentucky bar of the period 
seem to have had much in common with other states of the upper South and the 
slave state " border." See R. WOOSTER, POLITICS, PLANTERS AND PLAIN fOLK : 
COURTHOUSE AND STATEHOUSE IN THE UPPER SOUTH, 1850-1860 (1975). 
A further valid concern is that lawyer behavior in the public glare of a con­
stitutional convention may have been somewhat different from that in other political 
contexts. I am not sure that the convention was more visible than the other major 
state forum, the legislature, but even if it was it might be observed that the stakes 
in the convention were much higher too. The expected effects of constitution-making 
were long-term and fundamental. Consequently, the pressure to display their profes­
sional loyalty would have been correspondingly greater. I might also add that I am 
presently expanding the scope of my research to the Kentucky legislature of the period 
in order to deal with this concern. 
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they give a "different" view; that is, that they provide another useful 
tool for making sense of the past. This paper offers conclusions based 
largely upon quantitative analysis of roll call behavior in an attempt 
to address the questions raised in the introduction. 
There are unfortunately few private expressions of the motives 
underlying and explaining the behavior of the men, either lawyers or 
laymen, who met in Frankfort, Kentucky, from October through 
December, 1849, to write a new state constitution. The paucity of tradi· 
tional manuscript sources touching on the work of the convention is 
probably the result of the intensity of the delegates' work (sometimes 
consuming eighteen hours a day), and of the relative obscurity of most 
of the men who served in the body. Few of them have had their papers 
preserved; those like James Guthrie, Charles Wickliffe, Ben Hardin, 
and a few others who have left manuscripts said little about their roles 
in a state constitutional convention which had little or no apparent 
significance beyond the confines of the State. We do have, however, 
the official Debates of the Convention, 9 its Journal, and a good 
collection of the State's various partisan newspapers of the period. Taken 
together these sources provide a reasonable basis for the reconstruc­
tion of the dynamics of the body. 
Undoubtedly, the most reliable evidence for the behavior of the 
delegates is the roll call votes cast in the convention . Therefore, the 
centerpiece of this paper is a multiple regression analysis of the one 
hundred fifty-four roll call votes taken in that body. Examination of 
the Debates and newspaper discussion of the questions to be deter­
mined by the convention, from the early agitation for creating such 
a body in 1845-46 through the popular ratification debates of 1850, 
gave content to these polls. The use of a computer allowed examina· 
tion of over one hundred thousand discrete bits of information for 
patterns in the votes which might distinguish lawyer delegates from 
nonlawyer delegates. 
The use of multiple regression allows evaluation of "predictors," 
chosen for their likely contribution in explaining the vote of each 
delegate on each roll call. The regression equation reveals the degree 
of correlation between a "yes" or a "no" vote on a specific question 
and each of the predictor variables used. These figures are based upon 
the amount of scatter or '~variance" of the points plotted on an X-Y 
axis from a regression line which is drawn so as to minimize the variance 
9. Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision 
of the Constitution of the State ofKentucky, 1849 (1849) [hereinafter cited as Debates). 
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from it. The possible range of results is betwe~n 1.0 and -1.0. A 1.0 
represents a perfect positive correlation and a -1.0 a perfect negative 
(inverse) one. The larger the result for the predictor, whether positive 
or negative, the better the fit along the regression line, and the higher 
the correlation between the predictor and the vote (criterion) cast. 10 
An RSQ change of .14901 means that the predictor correlated with 
the vote under consideration 14.901 percent. Since 1.0 (100.0 percent) 
would mean that the predictor and vote correlated perfectly, and since 
0.0 would mean there was no correlation at all, .14901 (14.9%) shows 
a very small correlation between them. 
Interpretation of the regression output is more an art than a science 
when it comes to concluding that a predictor was not a contributing 
element in a particular vote. This is so because the amount of variance 
left unaccounted for by the chosen predictors hovers troublesomely 
off stage. This means that results which suggest that a given predictor­
for example, occupation-has a very low correlation with the vote 
pattern may still, in absolute terms, offer a better key to the votes 
cast than any other single factor. 
There is no set convention as to how much correlation one need 
find before concluding that the predictor was an important contributor 
to explaining the vote, however, some statisticians have suggested that 
a correlation of less than .20 is so slight as to be almost negligible. •• 
However, the regression equation not only offers a picture of the cor­
relation between each predictor and each vote. It also allows comparison 
between predictors by describing each predictor both in absolute terms 
and relative to all others. The regression also screens the predictors 
which are put into it late from the "noise" produced by the earlier 
predictors. In effect, each predictor screens those which follow. An 
example will best illustrate this effect. 
Suppose that on vote X one wishes to know whether being a lawyer 
correlated with voting yes. Let us also suppose that lawyers were 
wealthier and more often members of the Whig Party than were 
nonlawyers. 12 If one asks only were lawyers more likely to vote yes 
10. SeeR. McCALL, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS FOR PSYCHOLOGY 89- 140 (2d ed. 
1975). I am gratefully indebted to Dr. Charles F. Schanie, social psychologist and 
close friend, who offered methodological advice and programming expertise throughout 
this project. 
11. J . GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 
145 (2d ed. 1956) cited in F. WILLIAMS, REASONING WITH STATISTICS: SIMPLIFIED Ex­
AMPLES IN COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH 134 ( 1968). 
12. Although there is some evidence which supports making these assumptions 
11 The "Lawyers' Interest" 
on question X than nonlawyers, we cannot conclude that there was 
anything inherent exclusively in being a lawyer which would explain 
the result. The association of lawyers with a yes vote might equally 
be explained by their wealth or their political party affiliation. Did 
the yes vote correlate with being a lawyer, being wealthy, being a Whig, 
some combination of these attributes, or some other unidentified 
variable? By putting wealth and political party affiliation into the regres­
sion equation before occupation, one screens out that portion of the 
correlation with the yes vote which results from these previous predic­
tors. The RSQ change which is associated with occupation, a subse­
quent predictor, is that portion of the variance associated with being 
a lawyer after the amount of variance accounted for by the preceding 
predictors is removed. 
The predictors used in the regression analysis were chosen after 
a careful reading of the Debates, and analysis of collective biographical 
data on lawyers in the State in 1850 and on the lawyer and nonlawyer 
delegates to the convention. 13 The intention was that they account for 
as much of the total variance in the votes as a whole as was possible 
in the abstract. They also were intended to represent, in a broader 
way, some of the factors which are generally presumed to influence 
the b~havior of political figures. The seven predictors, and the order 
of their entry into the regression equation were as follows: 
1) The total wealth of the delegate as it appeared in state tax 
records for 1849; 14 
2) The value of slaves owned by the delegate as it appeared in 
the 1849 state tax records; 
in mid-nineteenth century Kentucky, there is as much the other way. Thus, they should 
not be assumed except for purposes of this illustration. 
13. The biographical information was accumulated from the United States Cen­
sus schedules for 1850 [Seventh Census of the United States: 1850 Population Schedules 
(Washington: National Archives Microfilm, 1%3)]; state tax records [Kentucky Tax 
Records, 1840-1852 (Frankfort : Kentucky State Historical Society Microfilm, 1958)]; 
and from numerous collective biographies, including BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDlA oF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY (J. Gresham ed. 1896), THE LAWYERS AND 
LAWMAKERS OF KENTUCKY (H. LEVIN ed. 1897), and DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY (M. Johnson & Malone eds. 1927-1936). There are a lso scores of county 
histories which are of variable usefulness and reliability. 
14. The tax records are indexed by county and year, and are (generally) in 
alphabetical order under the first letter of the individuaPs last name. In a few counties 
the tax records for 1849 have not survived. In these cases, figures for the nearest two 
years straddling 1849 were used, an equal rate of increase or decrease for the interven­
ing years was assumed, and a figure was projected for 1849. 
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3) The population density in 1850 in the district represented by 
the delegate in the convention; • s 
4) The percentage of the 1840 population in the district in 1850 
(rate of population growth or decline); 16 
5) The political party affiliation of the delegate in 1849; '' 
6) Whether the delegate was a serious politician;' 8 and, 
7) Whether the delegate was a lawyer or not.' 9 
15. The population densities _by district were derived by comparing reported 
population in the 1850 census by county with county areas reported in the BuREAU 
OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY & CITY DATA BooK: A STATISTICAL ABsTRACT SUPPLEMENT 
(WASH. 1977). Where counties have changed shape or been created since 1850, their 
areas were derived by the use of a planimeter. 
16. The calculation of change in population density is based on a comparison 
of the county population figures in the Sixth Census of the United States: 1840 (1841) 
with those in the Seventh Census. 
17. The party affiliation of the delegates was set out in the contemporary 
newspapers in their reports of the 1849 election returns. E.g., Louisville Journal, 
September 13, 1849, at 3, col. 4. The Lousiville Journal, the most prominent Whig 
paper in the State, was closely aligned with that party's leadership. 
18. Any standard of "seriousness" as a politician is of necessity arbitrary. The 
definition used for purposes of this paper was based on officeholding. If a delegate 
served at least five years in important offices between 1810 and 1890, he was designated 
a serious politician. The included offices were: governor, lieutenant governor, state 
secretary of state, state treasurer, state senator, state representative, state circuit judge, 
state appellate judge, U.S. senator, U.S. representative, and member of the U.S. cabinet. 
Service as circuit or appellate judge was included because these offices were clearly 
political in mid-nineteenth century Kentucky. Five years was chosen because the longest 
term of elective office in Kentucky before 1850 was four years. The United States 
senate, of course, was a six year term, but only a handful of men served there and 
then only after active political careers which brought them into the serious politician 
category in any case. 
The judges posed a more difficult problem . Before 1850 they bad life tenure, 
and after, they were elected for six-year terms. Under both systems the office clearly 
went to political men and so could not reasonably be omitted. In a randomly drawn 
sample of one hundred members of the Kentucky bar of 1850, twelve men served 
as circuit judges between 1792 and 1890. Eleven of these men had also served in the 
state legislature. See also WoosTER, supra note 8, at 92-94. 
The sources for officeholding were the Kentucky House and Senate Journals 
for the period 1792-1890 (the senate journals are especially useful since commissions 
for most important state offices could issue only after senate confirmation); REPORTS 
OF THE KENTUCKY AUDITOR 1844-1890 (these annual reports listed a ll persons who 
received salaries or fees from the State during the period they covered); THE 
BIOGRAPIITCAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1775-1949; BIOGRAPIITCAL 
DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH, 1774-1971 (R. Sobel ed. 1971); 
G. CLIFT, GOVERNORS OF KENTUCKY, 1792-1942 (1942). 
19. See supra note 13. 
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Multiple regression was used for two purposes. First, to show how 
much variance each of the seven predictors accounted for in absolute 
terms so that their relative importance could be ascertained. Second, 
to reveal how much of the total variance in each roll call was associated 
with being a lawyer after the other six predictors had been screened 
out. These two aspects of regression analysis offered an answer in quan­
titative terms to the question whether being a lawyer correlated 
significantly with positions taken in the convention, and permitted a 
more sophisticated evaluation of voting behavior than the simple and 
often misleading comparison of the votes cast by lawyers and nonlawyers 
on each question. 
Before embarking upon an interpretation of the numbers generated 
by the regression equation, there is an important caveat due the reader. 
The regression analysis reveals correlation, not causation. The numbers 
which will follow in this paper do not prove that wealth, party affilia­
tion, occupation, or any of the other predictors caused the delegates 
to vote as they did. Neither do they conclusively prove that these 
attributes did not cause the delegates to vote as they did. What they 
do demonstrate is that there was almost uniformly a very low, arguably 
negligible, correlation between being a lawyer or not being a lawyer 
and the pattern of roll call votes cast in the convention. 
One further warning is due the reader. Much of the work of the 
convention, as with most legislative bodies, was done by consensus . 
This fact was reflected both in the high percentage of delegate agree­
ment on a number of the roll calls and in the number of important 
clauses which were approved for inclusion in the Constitution without 
a reported roll call. There can be little doubt that the lawyer members 
of the convention were influential, at least in part, in formulating that 
consensus both before the delegates assembled and during the legislative 
process itself. The question remains, did the high degree of agre.ement 
between the lawyer and nonlawyer delegates in the convention reflect 
the fact that the lawyers' views were compatible with those of the general 
community (as represented by the nonlawyer delegates), or was the 
view of the community fashioned by the lawyers? 
There is no question that the 1849 Constitution embodied a high 
regard for the expertise of lawyers. 20 Did it do so because the general 
20. Forty-seven lawyers persuaded their neighbors to send them to the conven­
tion. Once there, they clearly dominated the body. Of the ten men nominated for 
its Presidency, eight were lawyers . The man elected, James Guthrie of Louisville, was 
one of them. Lawyers chaired nine of the eleven standing committees, and a "super" 
committee on the courts. Of the two clearly important select committees formed in 
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population acknowledged the need for this expertise or because the 
instrument was produced by a convention that was dominated by forty­
seven lawyers? The truth probably lies between these alternatives . 
However, a number of factors suggest that the lawyers were perceived 
as attuned to a broad social consensus. Indeed, other identifications 
seem to have predominated even in the minds of the lawyers 
themselves. 2 ' There was an early, overwhelming consensus for reform 
in the State. There was a relative absence of anti-lawyer sentiment in 
Kentucky in the late 1840's and a widespread acceptance of lawyers 
as _politicians and as delegates elected by the people There was a a 
voiced public recognition of the need for their expertise and, most 
importantly, there was a broad rejection of extreme measures touching 
law and lawyers when such ideas were offered before the convention 
assembled, as well as in that body. All of these elements suggest that 
there was no great gulf between the bar and the people. 
III. The Votes 
One approach to examining the cohesiveness of the lawyers in the 
convention is to look at the division of votes on each roll call between 
lawyers and nonlawyers. Although this is a superficial and undependable 
guide for answering the question whether the lawyers voted differently 
than nonlawyers because they were lawyers, it does offer a picture of 
cohesiveness, or the lack thereof, among lawyers. This may be a more 
important clue to the way their behavior in the convention was viewed 
by the people of the State than the regression analysis which will follow. 
Such perceptions are important to the historian because it could well 
be argued that what contemporaries believed to be true was at least 
as significant an historical fact as what now seems objectively true. 
Evidence of a discontinuity here would be especially interesting in 
political matters where the people could make their perceptions· felt 
directly through their ballo~s. Even this superficial approach 
the convention, that on rules, though chaired by a nonlawyer, was otherwise made 
up almost entirely of lawyers (there were five on a seven man committee). The other 
important select committee was formed in response to resolutions proposing reforms 
in the courts and pleading. Richard Gholson, a nonlawyer and the mover of the resolu­
tions, was appointed chairman. He was joined by four lawyers. The lawyers also clearly 
dominated the debates. Of the twenty-one delegates who spoke fi fty times or more 
on the floor , seventeen were lawyers. 
21 . The most apparent of these clisclosed by the Debates was that of political 
party affiliation, although regional loyalties also pervaded the comments of the delegates. 
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demonstrates that lawyers did not display close coordination of their 
votes on most issues. See Appendix I. 
The lawyer delegates divided nearly evenly on forty-nine of the 
one hundred and fifty-four roll calls taken in the convention (32o/o). 
On these votes they split so that approximately half of their votes were 
cast on each side of the question. 22 The lawyers showed a high degree 
of cohesiveness, that is, cast at least eighty percent (80o/o) of their votes 
together, on thirty-six votes (23 o/o). However, this latter figure is 
misleading since on twenty-one of these thirty-six votes the nonlawyers 
also cast at least eighty percent (80%) on the same side as the majority 
of the lawyers . Lawyers showed an eighty percent (80o/o) or greater 
cohesiveness on only fifteen votes (IOo/o) upon which nonlawyers did 
not match their percentage. On only four of these did the nonlawyers 
cast a majority of their votes in opposition to the lawyer majority. 
These four votes concerned whether candidates for judge of the Court 
of Appeals (72)23 and the circuit court (75) had to be lawyers of eight 
years experience in the practice and whether candidates for clerk of 
·the county and circuit courts (45) and the Court of Appeals (73) should 
be required to receive a certificate of fitness from a circuit or appellate 
judge before seeking election. The nonlawyers showed an eighty per­
cent (80o/o) rate of cohesiveness on twenty-nine votes (19o/o). If the 
twenty-one votes upon which they joined the lawyers in casting eighty 
percent of their votes on one side are subtracted, the eight votes which 
remain represent only five percent (5o/o) of the roll calls. On all eight 
of these votes lawyers cast at least sixty percent (60o/o) of their votes 
in agreement with their nonlawyer colleagues. These figures would not 
have been used to argue that the nonlawyers were acting together and 
the similarity of the figures for the lawyers probably would not have 
given much support to those who were looking for concerted, interest 
group voting by the bar. 
On thirty-nine votes (250Jo) lawyers and nonlawyers gave oppos­
ing majorities. However, on seventeen of these, fewer than sixty per­
cent (60o/o) of the lawyers voted together. This means that the lawyers 
were almost evenly divided on these questions. This leaves only twenty­
22. On none of these roll calls did the voting lawyers cast more than sixty per­
cent (600Jo) of their votes on one side or the other. 
23. The number designations of this and all following votes corresponds to 
the computer card column in which the data on the vote was reported. Appendix II 
reports the regression results in the same fashion. The data on the recorded roll calls 
was collected from the convention Debates, supra note 9. 
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two roll calls, fourteen percent (14%) of all polls taken, where sixty 
percent (600Jo) or more of the lawyers voted one way and a majority 
of the nonlawyers the other. In addition, it is clear from reading the 
Debates that lawyers almost always divided in debate. Usually, the 
leading speakers-both in terms of numbers of lines attributed to them 
and in the cogency of their contribution-were lawyers, but they spoke 
on opposite sides. In fact, some of the leading speakers seem almost 
to have been paired. When one spoke in favor the other responded 
with arguments against, and vice versa. 24 
Even from this simple analysis it appears that lawyers did not vote 
together in pursuit of interests which were in opposite to the will of 
most nonlawyers, with the possible exception of the four questions noted 
above. The regression analysis offers even better evidence for this 
proposition . 
If the regressions are examined with the intention of ascertaining 
the importance of being a lawyer relative to the other predictors in 
explaining voting behavior, " lawyerness" was the most important predic­
tor on only thirteen questions (8.4%). Political party affiliation was 
the highest predictor on sixty-three (40.90Jo), total wealth on thirty-one 
(20.1 %), the change in population density in the district on nineteen 
(12.30Jo), population density in the district on twelve (7 .80Jo), value of 
slaves owned on eight (5.2%), and "serious" politician on six (3 .9%). 
These results suggest that being a lawyer was not very important, com­
pared to the other factors, in explaining the distribution of the delegates' 
votes. 
The thirteen questions for which the cohort (occupation) was the 
highest predictor dealt with various topics. Three were votes on whether 
the Court of Appeals should consist of three or four judges ( 43, 71 , 
and 88). Three dealt with whether the Commonwealth should have 
peremptory challenges and defendants the right to appeal in criminal 
cases (84, 85, and 86). Two concerned whether Justices of the Peace 
or associate judges should join the County Judge as members of the 
county courts (91 and 92). One each concerned whether the City of 
Louisville and Jefferson County should have separate local govern­
ments (52), whether candidates for circuit judge should be required 
to have been practicing lawyers for eight years (75), whether a special 
24. The best example of this phenomenon was the duet of Ben Hardin , a leading 
lawyer Whig, and Charles Wickliffe, a leading lawyer Democrat. If one spoke, the 
other responded, and they remained at odds throughout most of the convention. These 
two men, who were life-long competitors, were cousins. 
17 The "Lawyers' Interest" 
election for governor should be held if the governor died during the 
first two years of his term (100), whether the state capital could be 
moved by a majority vote of the legislature (118), and whether the 
power of the convention was plenary or not (125) . 
The most striking thing revealed by the multiple regressions about 
the one hundred and fifty-four roll calls was the fact that on not one 
question did the cohort ("lawyerness") account for as much as fifteen 
percent (150Jo) of the total variance in the vote. See Appendix II. On 
only four votes did it account for ten percent (10%) or more of the 
variance in the votes . On the remaining votes it rarely accounted for 
as much as five percent (50Jo). The largest accounted for variance 
associated with the cohort was 14.9 percent on vote 84 which added 
a proviso allowing appeals in criminal cases to a clause which gave 
the Commonwealth the right to peremptory challenges. It accounted 
for 10.0 percent on vote 43, which concerned whether to create three 
or four appellate judgeships, 11.0 percent on roll call 48 which con­
cerned whether a sheriff should be permitted to serve two terms in 
three, and 14.5 percent on vote 75 which concerned the eight years 
law practice requirement of candidates for circuit judge~ One seems 
impelled by these results to conclude that "lawyerness" was a very 
weak predictor of voting behavior. Indeed, it rises to a level worthy 
of notice- on votes 75 and 84-only when matters of the most obvious 
interest to lawyers are concerned. 
Although the correlation between being a lawyer and voting 
behavior is uniformly weak, it may be useful to identify and discuss 
a few of the questions which would probably have been of the greatest 
interest to the bar. Among these were questions concerning the judiciary, 
jury reform, and the reform of pleading. 
A number of roll calls concerned the three layers of courts in 
Kentucky: the Court of Appeals, the circuit courts (general trial jurisdic­
tion), and the county courts. One important point of discussion was 
whether candidates for the appellate and circuit benches should be 
required by the constitution to have practiced law for eight years 
previous to their election. 25 As was usual in the convention lawyers 
disagreed. Each faction had its own lawyer spokesmen. Those who 
opposed the idea of qualification argued that the people should be 
untrammeled in their electoral choice. 26 The proponents of the restric­
25 . There were also age and residency requirements in the proposed clauses 
but these drew almost no comment. 
26. Debates, supra note 9, at 144-46. 
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tion argued that only those who could demonstrate command of the 
legal skills demanded by these offices should be eligible. It seems likely 
that this question was actually a test of the relative importance to the 
delegates of the freedom of the people to choose for all offices whomever 
they like, and the professionalism of the bench. Since it had been settled 
that judges must be elected, 27 those who entertained reservations about 
this mode of selection seem to have hoped to prevent the worst possible 
case, the election of a lay judge, by means of this restriction. This 
inference is supported not only by the comments of the two sides, but 
also by a statement made by John H. McHenry, a lawyer, who sug­
gested a compromise. He argued that those who wanted no restric­
tions should accept the ones demanded since "the opposite side required 
but those qualifications, on the part of the candidates, which all of 
them agreed the people themselves [would] require, whether it was in 
the constitution or not." 28 
The votes on whether to strike these restrictions were as close to 
a vote on an elective judiciary as was to be had in the convention. 
When the .yote was taken on whether to strike the requirement with 
regard to tile Court of Appeals (72) 83.9 percent of the lawyers and 
46.2 percent of the nonlawyers voted to retain the qualifications. 29 
Although this division looks significant, the regression on the vote shows 
that of the 55.7 percent of the variance accounted for by the seven 
predictors, only 3. 7 percent was associated with the cohort. By far the 
highest predictor o·n the vote was party affiliation which alone accounted 
for 40.7 percent of the total variance, with Whigs voting to retain the 
restriction. 
A similar vote on striking the restriction from the section on circuit 
judges (75) resulted in a higher correlation between being a lawyer and 
a "no" vote. Accounting for 14.5 percent of the variance in the vote, 
the cohort on this vote was the second highest of all the roll calls. 
This result is noteworthy because it suggests that at least on some 
27. It is clear from public discussions on the question of an elective judiciary 
during the delegate canvasses, that this was not a matter of discretion for the delegates. 
The people seemed determined to elect their judges. See, e.g., Louisville Journal , 
October 4, 1849, at 2, col. 1 (included in an editorial concerning the reforms to be 
addressed by the convention was the statement that since the question of electing judges 
had been settled by the people, "the true policy of-the conservatives in the convention 
is to yield the point of electing them, and endeavor to carry such provisions as are 
calculated to secure the election of good judges."). 
28. Debates, supra note 9, at 299. 
29. ld. at 651. 
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occasions, when questions involving the professionalism of the trial 
bench and protection of the bar's monopoly on judicial office were 
both at stake, lawyers were at least somewhat responsive to their pro­
fessional interests. What is of still greater interest is the fact that even 
on such a clear-cut professional issue, the correlation between 
"lawyerness" and a "no" vote was so weak. 80.6 percent of the lawyers 
voted not to strike while only 34.2 percent of the nonlawyers joined 
them. 30 It is also interesting to note that the laymen in the convention 
seem to have seen more reason for appellate judges to be lawyers of 
long experience than for the same credentials to be demanded of trial 
judges.31 
A direct assault upon the independence o( the judiciary was inherent 
in an attempt to make the judges of the Court of Appeals removable 
by a majority of the legislature (41). There seems to have been general 
agreement by the delegates that the clause of the 1799 Constitution, 
inserted there by the Jeffersonians, which provided that judges could 
be addressed out of office for "any reasonable cause" insufficient to 
support an impeachment, should be preserved. Its two-thirds require­
ment had proved insurmountable even during the " Old Court-New 
Court'' controversy of the 1820's, 32 and so ratifying that provision would 
preserve the remedy in theory for those who cherished it, while offer­
ing no serious danger to the judges of politically inspired removals. 
The attempt to substitute a majority for two-thirds of the legislature 
upset this balance. The change was clearly viewed as an attempt to 
bring the judges to heel, threatening their independence and the separa­
tion of powers between the judicial and legislative branches, and raising 
the spectre of the control of judges by a "reckless and temporary" 
political majority. 33 This then offers another question upon which 
lawyers might have been expected to discover and display their special 
point of view. When the vote was taken on substituting a majority 
for two-thirds, 84.1 percent of the lawyers and 69.4 percent of the 
30. /d. at 663. 
31. The difference in the weight of the cohort on votes 72 and 75 may merely 
reflect an awareness by the lawyer delegates of this sentiment. The prospect of the 
election of nonlawyers to the appellate bench was so remote that the lawyers' profes­
sional interests were not as directly touched by the vote on appellate credentials as 
by that on the trial courts. 
32. For a discussion of this remarkable episode in Kentucky legal history when 
there were two sitting Courts of Appeals, one "real" Court and one "anti-Court" 
See A. STICKLES, THE CRITICAL COURT STRUGGLE IN KENTIJCKY, 1819-1829 (1929). 
33. See Debates, supra note 9, at 149-55. 
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nonlawyers voted against the substitute. However, the cohort accounted 
for only 3.6 percent of the total variance in the vote. Being a lawyer 
had very little effect on the voting pattern. 
The size of the Court of Appeals was another area where the 
"peculiar interest" of the lawyers can be sought. This is especially true 
since the charge that lawyers wanted four judges rather than three, 
so as to have more "lawyer's offices" to fill, was leveled in the con­
vention against the lawyer delegates. 34 In the end, the convention was 
seriously divided over whether there should be three judges or four. 
Proponents of the fourth judge said he would expedite the work of 
the Court, or that fixing the size of the Court at four members would 
advance the cause of its branching and districting thereby bringing it 
closer to the people. Perhaps the best evidence that enlarging the Court 
of Appeals was not a "lawyers' project" is the fact that Richard 
Gholson, a nonlawyer and by any measure the most anti-lawyer delegate 
in the convention, favored it. 35 
The depth of the division between the delegates on this question 
was emphasized by the fact that three separate roll calls were taken 
upon it. The first came on a motion to strike the committee recom­
mendation of four judges and substitute three (43). 54.5 percent of 
the lawyers voted against striking but were overridden by 70.2 percent 
of the nonlawyers who succeeded in passing the motion. 36 The cohort 
accounted for ten percent (1 Oo/o) of the total variance, was the highest 
of the seven predictors, and made this vote one of only four on which 
occupation accounted for as much as ten percent (lOo/o) of the total 
variance. Again however, the most interesting feature of this vote is 
not that it drew some response from the lawyers, but that on a matter 
of such clear importance to the bar, the correlation should be so weak. 
It is also worth noting that only 17.5 percent of the total variance was 
accounted for by all the predictors together. 
After further discussion, a motion to reconsider was made (44). 
60.5 percent of the lawyers favored reconsideration as did 46.9 per­
cent of the nonlawyers. 31 Occupation accounted for four percent (4o/o) 
of the total variance. The motion passed and the size of the Court 
was fixed at four judges as recommended in the original committee 
versiOn. 
34. /d. at 641 (speech of A.K. Marshall). 
35. /d. at 642-43. 
36. ld. at 331 . 
37. !d. at 355. 
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The last attempt to strike the fourth judge came several days later 
on a motion to reconsider the adoption of the section mandating four 
judges (88). This time 66.7 percent of the lawyers voted against recon­
sidering and forty-two percent ( 42o/o) of tbe nonlawyers joined them 
to preserve the section intact. 38 The cohort accounted for 7.4 percent 
of the total variance and was the highest of the seven predictors, but 
all seven together accounted for only 18.6 percent of the variance in 
the vote. 
The conclusion implicit in these figures, that lawyers did not even 
join together to establish more "lawyers only" offices, is further 
strengthened by the action taken by the convention as to the number 
of circuit judges. The delegates reduced the number of circuits from 
nineteen to twelve. This action not only eliminated seven circuit 
judgeships, but also swept away seven Commonwealth's attorneys 
(prosecutors) positions. The only roll call taken on the number of cir­
cuits (74) came on an attempt to increase them from twelve (the com­
mittee's recommendation) to fourteen . 87.5 percent of the lawyers and 
92.3 percent of the nonlawyers said no. The cohort accounted for one 
percent (l%) of the total variance while all seven predictors combined 
accounted for only 9.3 percent. Lawyers did not vote to increase the 
important "lawyers only" offices. 
The need for reform of the county courts was an issue upon which 
nearly everyone could agree; 39 however, debate over the shape the new 
courts should assume gave rise to charges of " lawyers ' interest." The 
argument eventually reduced itself to whether the courts should con­
sist of an elected county judge and two elected associate judges, a county 
judge and elected justices of the peace, or just elected J.P.'s. The judges 
did not have to be lawyers40 but some delegates seem to have assumed 
that lawyers would be elected if the three judge approach were adopted, 
and opposed it on this ground. 4 1 The debate degenerated into charges 
38. /d. at 699. 
39. For a discussion of these courts in the period before the convention see 
R. IRELAND, THE COUNTY CoURTS IN ANTEBELLUM KENTUCKY (1972). The need for 
reform of these courts was one of the issues often raised in the public discussion which 
preceded the calling of the convention. See, e.g., The Convention (Frankfort), 1anuary 
16, 1847, at 2, col. 1; April3, 1847, at 1, col. 2. The Convention was a weekly newspaper 
published in 1847 and 1848. Its avowed purpose was to agitate for reform of the state 
constitution. It seems to have been connected with the Kentucky Yeoman through 
its publisher. 
40. Debates, supra note 9, at 697-98. 
41. /d. at 704. 
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that the "one judge system" was a "lawyers' project."42 The proponents 
of the three judge plan denied that it was for the benefit of the bar, 
but argued that the community would scarcely be injured if legal 
expertise appeared there as in the other courts of the State. ~ 3 
In the end, a number of votes were taken. Three stand out. The 
first was taken on an attempt to amend the three judge variant which 
had come from the committee, to one judge and the J.P .'s of the county 
(89). The change was approved with 48.8 percent of the lawyers and 
71.4 percent of the nonlawyers voting yes. 44 The second was a motion 
to reconsider striking the two associate judges (92) and it passed with 
7~.5 percent of the lawyers and 47.7 percent of the nonlawyers sup­
porting it. 45 In the end, the three judge alternative was chosen with 
the proviso that the legislature could abolish the offices of associate 
judges and add the J.P.'s to the court if it chose to do so (93). 83.3 
percent of the lawyers and 64.3 percent of the nonlawyers supported 
this compromise with their votes. 46 Although the convention apparently 
did not intend for the county judge and his associates to be lawyers, 
the move to restructure the court and reduce the power of the J .P.'s 
suggests that a desire existed to regularize and rationalize the county 
courts. 
The regressions on votes 89, 92, and 93 revealed only a small 
association between the cohort and the vote distribution. On vote 89 
it accounted for 5.1 percent, and on 93, .01 percent. Again, though 
the breakdown of the vote into percentages of lawyers and nonlawyers 
who voted on either side of these questions suggests that occupation 
may have made a difference in the votes, the regressions indicate that 
occupation contributes surprisingly little in explaining the voting pattern. 
Another area of special interest to the bar was the convention's 
concern with the problems of the criminal justice system. Kentuckians 
seem to have had a genius for homicide in the nineteenth century and 
this, in part, seems to have enhanced popular interest in reform of 
the prosecutorial system. 47 There was vocal concern about the 
42. /d. at 706. 
43. /d. at 708-10. 
44. /d. a t 706. 
45. /d. at 715. 
46. !d. at 716. 
47. See id. at 680, 688, 794. One of The Convention 's correspondents, 
"Philodemos," stated that problem clearly: 
[W]here, short of a state of down-right, barbarism and savage ferocity, 
are deeds of daring villany [sic] done with greater impunity than with us 
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breakdown of "law and order" and an apparent widespread contempt 
for punishments which were not exacted. Although other aspects of 
the criminal justice system were discussed, critics turned most of their 
attention to the jury. 48 
The essential problem seems to have been jury packing by defen­
dants. Their friends or retainers would "stand at and around the court 
house door', so that when the regularly called jury panel had been 
exhausted by excuse and defense challenges, and the sheriff was ordered 
to summon bystanders to fill it up, the defendanfs partisans would 
be empaneled. 49 The problem was especially severe when men of 
influence and wealth were charged with crime. so The solution offered 
for this problein was to allow the Commonwealth a fixed number of 
peremptory challenges, which until that time, only the defendant had 
possessed. This would allow the prosecutor to strike the friends of the 
defendant from the panel. Opponents of the change argued that it would 
tip the balance too heavily in favor of the state. st Proponents said 
that with the presumption of innocence and the requirement that 
criminal juries be unanimous in rendering a guilty verdict, the advan­
tages on the side of the defendant would still be great even if the clause 
in Kentucky? ... [Though) our Criminal Code is as rigid and severe as 
might be , ...those laws ... are altogether insufficient to arrest the hand 
of murderous violence and daily outrate among us ....[U]nprovoked and 
unpunished murders . . . are green in the recollection of all. 
The Convention, January 9, 1847, at 1, col. 2-3. See also Ireland, Law and Disorder 
in Nineteenth Century Kentucky, 32 VAND. L. REv. 281 (1979); and C. EATON, THE 
GROWTH OF SouTHERN CrviLIZATION, 1790-1860 at 277-78 (1961) (where it is stated 
that this problem was a pervasive one in the ante-bellum South). 
48. See, e.g., The Convention, January 9, 1847, at 1, col. 1; January 30, 1847 
at 2, col. 2. The use of jurors in civil cases a lso drew fi re, and much of the criticism 
leveled at their weaknesses in that context could be applied to jurors sitting in criminal 
cases as well. See Louisville Journal, September 15, 1849, at 2, col. 2 and September 
18, 1849, at 3, col. 1. For the convention's treatment of these questions, see Debates, 
supra note 9, at 676-83. 
49. Debates, supra note 9, at 676 (speech of Richard L. Mayes). 
50. EATON, supra note 47, at 278. Eaton, a highly respected historian of the 
ante-bellum South, used two infamous Kentucky murder cases-one which occurred 
in 1846 and the other in 1854-to illustrate the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice 
system when influential men were charged with the crime of a murder. The earlier 
case was the trial of Lafayette Shelby, the grandson of a former governor. The illustrious 
Henry Clay represented the defendant and the trial received wide play in the press . 
Shelby's acquittal set off a furious public debate. The convention delegates were 
undoubtedly familiar with the case and the public uproar it engendered. Indeed, some 
of them specifically referred to the case on the floor. 
51. Debates, supra note 9, at 679. 
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were included. Supporters of the change finally charged that lawyers 
would oppose it because their true interest lay with defendants who 
paid their fees. 
Three roll calls dealt with the grant of peremptory challenges to 
the state. The first (82) required the legislature to provide such 
challenges. 56.1 percent of the lawyers voted against the section but 
it was passed over their opposition by the vote of 61.7 percent of the 
nonlawyers. s2 A subsequent vote was taken on whether to make the 
provision permissive rather than mandatory. 52.3 percent of the lawyers 
voted in favor of changing the wording of the provision from shall 
to may. The amendment carried with the help of 70.8 percent of the 
nonlawyers. s l The regression shows that on the first vote (82) 14.5 per­
cent of the total variance was accounted for by the seven predictors. 
The cohort accounted for only 1.5 percent. The second vote (83) shows 
that the cohort was again a weak predictor, accounting for only 1. 7 
percent of the total variance in the vote. Party affiliation was the highest 
predictor on both of these votes. 
After it was decided that the state should be allowed peremptory 
challenges, a third vote was taken relating to the question. This vote 
(86) was on whether to add a section which would provide that the 
Commonwealth should never have more than one-fifth the number of 
challenges available to defendants, thus denying the Commonwealth 
the ability to pack juries. 59.5 percent of the lawyers and 69.8 percent 
of the nonlawyers voted against the restriction. s4 The occupation predic­
tor accounted for only 1.4 percent of the total variance in the vote. 
Another criminal justice issue which should have been of great 
interest to the bar was a proposal to provide for the right of appeal 
in criminal cases. Such a right had never been granted under the previous 
constitutions. For this reason some of the delegates doubted the 
legislature could allow for such appeals in the absence of a constitu­
tional enabling clause. 
The members of the convention thoroughly discussed the advis­
ability of allowing criminal appeals. Among the key arguments offered 
was the irrationality of allowing appeals in civil cases where as little 
as fifty dollars was involved, while denying appeals in criminal cases 
where life and liberty were at stake.ss Supporters of the right to criminal 
52. /d. at 683. 
53. !d. at 692. 
54. Jd. at 694. 
55. !d. at 674, 677. 
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appeals also suggested that because of the conditions of trials which 
required immediate rulings from the bench, the trial judge was all too 
prone to error. H 
The most telling argument in support of criminal appeals was the 
need for statewide uniformity in interpretation and application of 
criminal law and procedure. Both of these concerns were articulated 
first by lawyers and seem to exhibit a perspective on public issues gained 
by practicing law. With reference to the need for uniformity of deci­
sion, several lawyer delegates referred to two recent cases in which defen­
dants were tried in separate circuits for identical crimes committed under 
similar circumstances. In both cases the defendants were convicted. 
Motions for benefit of clergy were made in both courts, but in one 
it was entertained by the judge and in the other it was not. The result, 
it was charged, of these different rulings was that one defendant was 
hanged and the other released. 57 If lawyers were to make their influence 
felt, surely it would be on precisely such an issue. Here their own pro­
fessional experience set them apart from their lay colleagues. Their 
concern for regularity and predictability would certainly surface, and, 
at least arguably, their economic interest lay clearly on one side. Yet, 
here too the lawyers divided. 
Those who opposed allowing appeals argued that the delays inci­
dent to them would defeat justice. Ben Hardin, a veritable institution 
at the bar and in politics, opposed the proposition on this ground and 
also on the ground that, "I never saw an innocent man convicted, 
while I have seen a thousand guilty escape. " 58 Nearly all of the lawyers 
who participated in the discussion drew upon their personal experience 
with criminal trials, but as on nearly every other question, they took 
opposing sides. Lawyers disagreed among themselves on the question 
of appeals, just as they had disagreed concerning peremptory challenges 
and seemingly, everything else touching the criminal justice system. 
The only exception to this statement was their general concurrence that 
too many criminals escaped punishment, a concern clearly shared by 
the communities which had elected them. 
After preliminary maneuvering, the convention voted to add to 
the provision on peremptory challenges language giving the legislature 
56. !d. at 674. 
57. !d. at 678, 685. I have been unable to identify the cases to which these 
remarks refer, but the noted statements were not challenged from the floor or in the 
press. 
58. Id. at 686. 
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the express power to pass a law regulating criminal appeals. 59 The sec­
tion as finally approved read: "The General Assembly may pass laws 
authorizing writs of error in criminal or penal cases and regulating 
the right of challenge of jurors therein. " 60 The vote on adding the 
appeals to the section (84) found 79.5 percent of the lawyers and 100 
percent of the nonlawyers supporting the change. 6 1 In this permissive 
form, the section was approved (85) by 86.4 percent of the lawyers 
and 97 .9 percent of the nonlawyers. 62 
On vote 84 the cohort accounted for 14.9 of the variance. This 
was the greatest amount. of variance accounted for by the cohort on 
any of the roll calls. Since occupation did not account for much of 
the variance in the vote allowing the legislature to give peremptory 
challenges to the state, or on the question of permitting a similar discre­
tion with regard to appeals, the increase in variance accounted for by 
the cohort when these clauses were combined seems an anomaly. Perhaps 
it manifests, among members of the bar, a more widespread concern 
about the power of the state in criminal cases. Such feelings, or others, 
led some lawyers to argue that if the state was to be allowed peremp­
tory challenges, then the defendant's right to an appeal must be 
guaranteed. The discussion in the Debates is consistent with this 
hypothesis and suggests that the lawyers' opposition was attributable 
to the fact that they wanted the right to appeal expressly set out in 
the constitution. 63 
Perhaps the matters raised in the convention concerning which 
critics of the legal profession· most expected concerted opposition from 
the bar were embodied in a catchall set of resolutions offered by Richard 
Gholson.64 In them he proposed that special pleading be abolished, 
that all cases be tried by a jury "on their merits," that chancery courts 
be abolished, that land titles be quieted, and that the concurrence of 
a majority of the Court of Appeals be made necessary to the reversal 
59. !d. at 692. 
60. !d. at 686. 
61. /d. at 692. 
62. /d. 
63. What correlation existed was with a "no" vote by the lawyers . 
64. In the convention, Gholson frequently expressed his disgust with the legal 
profession. Indeed, if there was a spokesman for the anti-lawyer sentiment which did 
exist in the State, here was the man. There is also some circumstantial evidence that 
Gholson was the vituperative "Jefferson" from whom I quoted at the beginning of 
this paper. Whether he was "Jefferson" or not, he did make several attacks on the 
bar in the convention. 
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of the opinion of a lower court. 65 These resolutions were referred to 
a select committee appointed by the convention's lawyer-President, 
James Guthrie, which consisted of Gholson and four lawyers. A 
majority of the committee proposed that two commissions, made up 
of ''persons learned in the law,'' be assigned the task of revisin$ and 
simplifying the statute law of the State and of drafting a simplified 
code of civil and criminal procedure. Gholson felt obli~d to ·make 
a minority report, one of the few in the convention, in which he en­
dorsed the recommended commissions of "persons learned in the law," 
but wished to take the further step of providing, in the constitution, 
that, "[n]o civil suit shall be dismissed for lack of technical form 
. .. but every citizen shall have justice freely without sale, p'rotnptly, 
without denial or delay, and a trial upon the merits of bis ca5e·." In 
order to accomplish this end Gholson proposed that the legislature be 
ordered to "provide one general form of action in which all civil suits 
shall be brought. " 66 It is suggestive that no other member of the con­
vention ever touched upon the resolutions offered by Gholsi'>n in his 
minority report. 
There seems to have been sympathy for the idea of a general revi­
sion of the statute law and of procedure. 6 ' It is interesting that no 
one challenged the premise, indeed it was embraced even by Gholson, 
that these revisions should be carried out by lawyers . As for Gholson's 
more radical ideas, it is possible that the lawyers killed them behind 
the scenes, but it is difficult to believe that such a naud exercise of 
power could have passed without comment on the floor It seems more 
likely that there was no need for concerted action by the bar-even 
if such a thing had been possible-since Gholson's views were so extreme 
as to be unacceptable to a majority of nonlawyers as well. 
In the end there were six roll calls which dealt with revision and 
simplification of the law and pleading. The first (146) was a vote on 
whether to order a revision of the statute law of the State, "so as to 
have but one law on any one subject, all of which shait be in plain 
english [sic]. " Eighty percent (800Jo) of the lawyers and 90.9 percent 
of the nonlawyers voted yes. 68 The seven predictors only a<:counted 
for 11.7 percent of the total variance in the vote. Of the seven, the 
65. /d. at 36. 
66. /d. at 128. 
67. For a plea for simplification of the law accompanied by some a~se of 
the bar, see the letter from "Perserverando" published in The Convention, February 
13, 1847, at 2, col. 2. 
68. Debates, supra note 9, at 880. 
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serious politician predictor was the highest. "Lawyerness" accounted 
for less than one percent (1 OJo) of the total variance. The second vote 
(147) would have directed the preparation of a code of civil and criminal 
practice with a view to shortening and simplifying the State's rules of 
procedure. 54.3 percent of the lawyers and 65.9 percent of the 
nonlawyers again voted yes . 69 This time the predictors accounted for 
25.7 percent of the variance in the vote, but the cohort still accounted 
for less than one percent (1 %) . 
By the following day several delegates entertained second thoughts 
about these two votes and the convention agreed to reconsider the second 
vote. This action followed a debate in which some members stressed 
the expense of such a commission, and Elijah Nuttall, a downstate 
lawyer with a tendency to wound the causes he supported, declared 
the task impossible. If Chitty could not lay down clear rules of pleading, 
he argued, it certainly could not be done by a Kentucky commission. 70 
As usual, lawyers spoke on both sides. 71 When the vote was taken (148) 
61 .5 percent of the lawyers and 43 .1 percent of the nonlawyers favored 
reconsideration. 72 The cohort accounted for less than one percent (1 OJo) 
of the total variance. A fourth vote (149) was taken on whether to 
reconsider the first vote (146) concerning revision of the statutes. It 
too was passed with 68.4 percent of the lawyers and 38.5 percent of 
the nonlawyers voting in favor. ' 3 The cohort accounted for less than 
two percent (20Jo) of the variance. The fifth vote (150) was taken after 
discussion upon whether the words " In Plain English" should be 
stricken from the mandate of the first commission. The argument 
centered on whether elimination of arcane jargon, the meaning of which 
was well-settled, would simplify the law or lead to greater difficulties 
than its retention. 7 4 The motion to strike was adopted by a narrow 
margin with 72.2 percent of the lawyers and 36.5 percent of the 
nonlawyers voting in favor. 7 ~ 
At first blush, this vote appears to have been an example of cohesive 
behavior by the bar. However, the regression shows that the cohort 
accounted for only 3. 7 percent of the total variance in the vote. 
Accordingly, one may conclude that "lawyerness" was an almost 
69. /d. 
70. Id. at 903 . 
71. See id. at 901-07. 
72. ld. at 907. 
73. /d. at 909. 
74. Id. at 908-09. 
75. /d. at 909. 
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negligible factor in explaining the division . The sixth roll call (151) 
was taken on whether to readopt the st~tutory revision directive as 
amended-without "in plain English . " 76 62.2 percent of the lawyers 
voted no but the 66.7 percent of the nonlawyers who voted yes carried 
the section. 77 23 .1 percent of the total variance in the vote was accounted 
for by the predictors but the cohort only contributed 5.2 percent. Again, 
the raw division is deceptive. The regression shows that occupation 
did not explain the distribution of the votes. 
All six of these important "lawyers' interest" votes point in the 
same direction. Occupation played an insignificant part in explaining 
the votes of the delegates. However, the apparent negative position 
taken by a majority of the lawyer delegates on these questions must 
have done little to discredit those critics who charged that the bar would 
die-in-the-last-ditch before it would accept the reform of pleading. Thus, 
after these issues had been settled, Gholson rose, and with passion 
opined that the bar had indeed proven recalcitrant on this question. 78 
Two other matters deserve inclusion in the selected examples of 
the behavior of lawyers in the convention . They both reflect on the 
presence or absence of commercial-mindedness in the bar. One con­
cerned the availability of state financial support for internal 
improvements, and the other the availability of limited liability to 
shareholders of business corporations. Both of these issues had been 
the subject of occasionally heated public discussion in Kentucky as 
elsewhere before the convention took them up. 
A section was proposed which provided that the legislature be per­
mitted to contract debts only "to meet casual deficits or failures in 
the revenue, or for expenses not provided for ... '' and such borrow­
ing could not exceed 500,000 dollars. The only exceptions were in case 
of the need for money "to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or, 
if hostilities are threatened, provide for the public defense. " 79 From 
the discussion of this section it is clear that the proponents intended 
for this clause to put an end to state involvement in internal 
improvements. 80 
76. The clause concerning the revision of pleading had already passed without 
a roll call. 
77. !d. at 910. 
78. The new state code of pleading, eventually produced by three prominent 
lawyers in the early 1850's, was one of the most important changes implemented by 
the constitutional reform movement of mid-century. 
79. Debates, supra note 9, at 781. 
80. See id. at 753-77. It is clear that there was public opposition to inclusion 
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The first roll call ( 1 09) was taken on a motion to strike the language 
"or for expenses not provided for" from the section. Some delegates 
apparently feared that this language would allow the legislature a carte 
blanche to use the credit of the State to the extent of 500,000 dollars 
for whatever purpose it thought proper. The purpose of the motion 
was to remove this discretion. 81 Again, the lawyers divided in debate 
and in their votes. 45.5 percent of the lawyers and 63 .3 percent of 
the nonlawyers voted to strike and succeeded in passing the motion.S 2 
The seven predictors accounted for 28.8 percent of the variance in the 
vote with total wealth being the highest at 14.2 percent of the total 
variance, that is, 49.4 percent of the accounted for variance. The greater 
his wealth, the more likely a delegate was to vote against striking. The 
cohort accounted for slightly less than one percent (1 OJo) of the total 
variance, or, 3.2 percent of the accounted for variance. The second 
vote (110) was upon enacting the section as amended. When the vote 
was taken, 65.9 percent of the lawyers and sixty-six percent (660Jo) of 
the nonlawyers voted in favor of the section. 83 The predictors accounted 
for 38.3 percent of the variance with total wealth again the highest 
predictor, accounting for 18.1 percent of the variance, or 47.2 percent 
of the accounted for variance. The greater the wealth the more likely 
was a "no" vote. The cohort was again associated with less than one 
percent (1 %) of the total variance, or 1.4 percent of that accounted for. 
The other roll call which touched upon the presence or absence 
of commercial sympathies among the lawyer was a proposition that 
no charter be granted in the future which conferred banking or trading 
powers on a corporation unless it also provided that the stockholders' 
private property be liable for the debts of the corporation. If the 
legislature determined that an exemption should be granted, this could 
be done only by submitting the proposed charter to the people at a 
general election for the voters' approval or rejection. 84 A substitute 
which would have expressly limited the liability of shareholders in future 
corporations to the amount of their stock was rejected without a roll 
call. When the original provision came to a vote it was defeated by 
of such a clause (especially among Whigs), but it also is clear that such opposition 
spoke for a minority of the population. See~ e.g. , Louisville Journal, October 12, 
1849, at 3, col. 2. · 
81. See the comments of C.A. Wickliffe and William Preston in this regard. 
Debates, supra note 9, at 783. 
82. Debates, supra note 9, at 784. 
83. /d. 
84. Id. at 836. 
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the "no" votes of 75.7 percent of the lawyers and 57.4 percent of 
the nonlawyers." The predictors accounted for 30.2 percent of the 
variance in the vote. Political party affiliation was by far the highest 
predictor, accounting for 22.5 percent of the total variance, or 74.6 
percent of the accounted for variance, with Whigs voting against the 
provision. The cohort accounted for one percent (1 o/o) of the total 
variance, or 3.6 percent of the accounted for variance. Lawyers seem 
to have been no more commercial-minded than their lay colleagues. 
IV. Conclusion 
The inferences to be drawn from analysis of the debates, the roll 
call divisions, and their examination by means of multiple regression 
analysis, seem clear. Lawyers did not act together in the Kentucky con­
stitutional convention of 1849. That evidence which, at first, seems 
to s~pport the cohesiveness thesis-the small ~umber of questions where 
most lawyers appeared on one side in a vote-proves weak when 
evaluated in context. The lawyers' individuality in the debates, and 
the more sophisticated roll call analysis made possible by application 
of multiple regression, persuasively argue against it. 
Even with regard to matters which should have been of special 
interest to the bar, the mere fact that a delegate was a lawyer offered 
almost no help in explaining the scattering of delegate votes. Indeed, 
such factors as political party affiliation, wealth, and rate of popula­
tion growth in the delegate's district, were much better relative predic­
tors of roll call behavior than was occupation. By far the best predic­
tor was party affiliation . It was the highest predictor on forty-one per­
cent (41 o/o) of the votes, being associated with fifty percent (50%) or 
more of the accounted for variance on thirty-four of them. Even on 
those votes where being a lawyer was the best predictor of voting 
behavior, occupation never accounted for enough variance to be con­
sidered more than a "slightly" correlated predictor. With an appropriate 
qualification, this may even be said of the four noted votes where the 
cohort accounted for ten percent (10%) or more of the variance. 
Whether political lawyers acted together, capturing and shaping 
the substantive public policy of mid-nineteenth century Kentucky, may 
seem a small matter. However, the broad question concerning the impact 
of the legal profession on our ·institutions and society, addressed here 
in the Kentucky setting, is not. Given the ubiquity of lawyers in 
85 . /d. 
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American life and politics, the question surely deserves more serious 
attention from legal historians than it has hitherto received. 
A definitive answer to the question whether a "lawyer's interest" 
has existed-or perhaps still exists-and has seriously influenced our 
public life in support of particular groups or for its own benefit, must 
await further research. However, armed with the new tools of the social 
sciences we are today better able than ever before to undertake the 
empirical research which is necessary in order to offer a response. 
Indeed, such research may be the only way one can respond to charges 
like those made by our Kentucky "Jefferson" with any hope of 
persuasion. 86 
86. By suggesting that the role of the political bar has not been to shape society's 
ends to its own, I do not mean to argue that the persistent, pervasive participation 
of lawyers in politics has had no impact on our politics. There is rather, an intriguing 
"next hypothesis" worth considering. It emphasizes the characteristic which almost 
all lawyers do share, no matter how different from one another they may be in other 
respects. Lawyers put a higher value on " process" than do laymen. Because of this 
attribute, I would suggest, the presence of lawyers in public life has affected our politics. 
Political lawyers have shaped our public means rather than our ends, and in so doing, 
have acted as conservators of our political legitimacy. To the extent that any simple 
bifurcation of these two aspects of human behavior is appropriate-and I am aware 
o f the danger inherent in its simplicity-lawyers are urged by training and experience 
to make it. If this hypothesis is correct, the profession has still made a fundamental 
contribution to what is arguably unique in our public life. Its members have instilled, 
or at least reinforced, our society's dedication to legitimate means- the value many 
would conclude is the genius of our institutions. 
33 The "Lawyers' Interest" 
APPENDIX I 

ROLL CALL DIVISIONS BETWEEN LAWYER 

AND NON-LAWYER DELEGATES 

Absolute Percentage 
Law~er Non-Lawyer Law~er Non-Law~er 
Vote Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
039 29 18 26 23 61.7 38.3 53.1 46.9 
040 20 25 30 18 44.4 55.6 62.5 37.5 
041 7 37 15 34 15.9 84. I 30.6 69.4 
042 9 34 25 22 20.9 79.1 53.2 46.8 
043 20 24 33 14 45.5 54.5 70.2 29.8 
044 26 17 23 26 60.5 39.5 46.9 53. 1 
045 8 32 25 20 20.0 80.0 55.6 44.4 
046 12 26 31 15 31.6 68.4 67.4 32.6 
047 23 15 14 32 60.5 39.5 30.4 69.6 
048 29 8 16 30 78.4 21.6 34.8 65.2 
049 13 21 8 37 38.2 61.8 17.8 82.2 
050 30 7 26 19 81.1 18.9 57.8 42.2 
051 5 36 19 25 12.2 87.8 43.2 56.8 
052 6 31 15 24 16.2 83 .8 38.5 61.5 
053 29 12 15 29 70.7 29.3 34.1 65.9 
054 19 24 19 26 44.2 55.8 42.2 57.8 
055 17 28 14 32 37.8 62.2 30.4 69.6 
056 20 25 20 26 44.4 55.6 43.5 56.5 
057 21 23 35 11 47.7 52.3 76.1 23.9 
058 30 14 39 9 68.2 31.8 81.3 18.8 
059 27 17 35 12 61.4 38.6 74.5 25.5 
060 16 28 24 25 36.4 63.6 49.0 51.0 
061 16 27 20 28 37.2 62.8 41.7 58.3 
062 29 14 32 16 67.4 32.6 66.7 33.3 
063 21 21 29 17 50.0 50.0 63.0 37.0 
064 11 31 23 23 26.2 73.8 50.0 50.0 
065 16 27 14 33 37.2 62.8 29.8 70.2 
066 32 II 34 13 74.4 25.6 72.3 27.7 
067 13 29 9 37 31.0 69.0 19.6 80.4 
07(].. 20 21 19 27 48.8 51.2 41.3 58.7 
071 13 19 22 17 40.6 59.4 56.4 43.6 
072 5 26 21 18 16. 1 83.9 53.8 46.2 
073 6 25 23 17 19.4 80.6 57.5 42.5 
074 4 28 3 36 12.5 87.5 7.7 92.3 
075 6 25 25 13 19.4 80.6 65.8 34.2 
076 3 39 6 41 7. 1 92.9 12.8 87.2 
077 12 30 12 36 28.6 71.4 25.0 75.0 
078 23 17 14 35 57.5 42.5 28.6 71.4 
079 26 14 24 24 65.0 35.0 50.0 50.0 
080 28 12 26 19 70.0 30.0 57.8 42.2 
081 17 24 24 23 41.5 58.5 51.1 48.9 
082 23 18 18 29 56. 1 43.9 38.3 61.7 
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· Absolute Percentage 
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. ()&j 38 ' 6 ;f1 I 86.4 18.6 97.9 2.1 
. 086· 17 .~ 2S 13 30 40.5 . 59.5 30.2 69.8 
oj1 '. 28 . 7 . 32 16 80.0 20.0 66.7 33.3 
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· Absolute · Percentage 
Law~er Nort-Lawyer Lawyer Non-Lawyer 
Vote Yes No· Yes No Yes No Yes No 
129 27 15 35 13 64.3 . 35.7 . 72.9 27.1 
130 23 19 21 22 54.8 45.2 55 .1 44.9 
131 25 18 32 17 . 58.1 41.9 65.3 34.7 
132 26 18 30 20 59.1 40.9 60.0 40.0 
133 4 .... 34 10 41 10.5 89..5 19.6 80.4 
134 . 18 21 35 17 46.2 33.8 67 .3 32.7 
135 · 4 35 8 42 10.3 89.7 16.0 84.0 
136 9 28 20 27 24.3 75.7 42.6 57.4 
137 2.1 17 28 19 55.3 44.7 5'1.6 40.4 
138 38 4 37 12 90.5 9.5 15.5 24.5 
139 20 19 33 .. 16 51.3 48.7 67.3 32.7 
140 14 (25 24 -25 35.9 64.1 49.0 51.0 
143 30 11 35 12 73.2 26.8 74.5 25.5 
144 36 5 41 5 87.8 12.2 i9. l 10.9 
145 . . .. 1 32 1 43 . 3.0 97.0 2.3 97.7 
146 28 . 7 40 4 80.0 20.0 90.9 9. 1 



















150 26 10 19 . 33 72.2 27.8 36.5 63 .5 
lSI 1.4 23 34 17 37.8 62.2 66.7 33 .3 . 
152 34 4" 40 10 ' ·-89.5 10..5 80.0 20.0 
153 28 14 28 23 66.7 ·33.3 54.9. 45 . 1 
154 . 23 18 35 14' 56.1 43 .9 71.4 28.6 
155 22 19 3.5 14 53.7 . -'6.3 71.4 28.6 
156 18 23 16 33 43.9 56.1 . .32.7 67.3 
157 30 5 43 4 85.7 14.3 91.5 8.5 
158 It u 21 25 29.7 . "70.3 45.7 54.3 
· 159 11 29· 21 26 27.5 72.5 44.7 55.3 
160 9 ,34 l 50 · 20.9 19.1 2.P 98.0 
161 16 28 31 20 36.4 63.6 . 60.8 39.2 
162 28 16 20 ·. 31 63.6 36.4 39.2 60.8 
163 16 .24 13 36 40.0 60.0 26.5 73 .5 
164 22 ..• 17 25 23 56.5 43.6 52. 1 47 .9 
165 22 18 24 23 55.0 45.0 51.1 48.9 
166 27 . 15 24 23 64. 3 35.7 51.1 48.9 
167 31 "i t 31 17 73.8 26.2 64.6 35.4 
168 6 35 5 42 14.6 85.4 t().6 89.4 
169 22 21 30 19 51.2 48.8 61.2 38.8 



















173 23 17 31 19 57.5 42.5 .62.0 38.0 
174 .5 36 8 39 12. ~ 87.8 17:0 83.0 
175 22 20 25 . 27 47.6 52.4 48.1 51.9 
176 20 22 25 27 47.6 52.4 48.1 .51.9 
36 The Journal of the Legal Profession 
Absolute Percentage 
Lawyer Non-Lawyer Lawyer Non-Lawyer 
Vote Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
177 11 29 8 42 27.5 72.5 16.0 84.0 
178 12 30 21 30 28.6 71.4 41.2 58.8 
179 19 22 24 26 46.3 53.7 48.0 52.0 
180 II 29 12 38 27.5 72.5 24.0 76.0 
181 24 17 32 17 58.5 41.5 65.3 34.7 
182 13 26 18 31 33.3 66.7 36.7 63.3 
183 21 18 21 28 53.8 46.2 42.9 57.1 
184 17 23 17 34 42.5 57.5 33.3 66.7 
185 8 28 14 36 22.2 77.8 28.0 72.0 
186 21 17 33 18 55.3 44.7 64.7 35.3 
187 23 16 37 12 59.0 41.0 75 .5 24.5 
188 2 29 4 39 6.5 93 .5 9.3 90.7 
189 25 8 22 21 75.8 24.2 51.2 48.8 
190 10 30 19 28 25.0 75.0 40.4 59.6 
191 15 28 12 38 34.9 65.1 24.0 76.0 
192 21 24 35 17 46.7 53.3 67.3 32.7 
193 16 24 9 40 40.0 60.0 81.4 81.6 
194 19 21 12 38 47.5 52.5 24.0 76.0 
195 21 18 29 21 53.8 46.2 58.0 42.0 
196 46 1 49 0 97.9 2. 1 100.0 0 .0 
APPENDIX II 

ACCOUNTED FOR VARIANCE ON ROLL CALL VOTES: THE TOTAL, 

THE HIGHEST PREDICTOR, AND THE COHORT 

Acounted For Variance Highest Predictor Cohort Code {Lawyerness) 
Vote RSQ 








% Of Accounted 
For Variance 
..., 
039 .31891 31.89% 034* .28988 90.900Jo .00554 1.740Jo ::r ~ 
040 .92624 92.62% 034 .85236 92.02% .00094 . 10% " 
041 .12943 12.94% 029 .04730 36.54% .03591 27.74% ~ 
042 .35229 35.23% 029 . I 1356 32.23o/o .07686 21 .82% ~ ~ 
043 .17452 17.45% 221 .09952 57.02% .09952 57.02% '< 
044 . 11978 11.98% 034 .04597 38.38% .04158 34.71% 
~..., 
en 



















048 .43308 43.31% 034 .16554 38.22% . 10979 25.35% ~ en 
049 .25970 25.97% 034 .13406 51.62% .04529 17.44% ...... 
~ 
050 .20006 20.01% 034 . 16165 80.80% .01369 6.84% 
051 .41913 41.91% 034 . 19727 47.04% .07935 18.93% 
052 .17231 17.23% 221 .14459 25.88% .04459 25.88% 
053 .33788 33.79% 034 .14906 44.12% .06124 18.12% 
054 .16135 16.14% 028 .08740 54.17% .00038 .24% 
055 .20532 20.53% 034 .1 1317 55.12% .00138 .67% 
*The variable labels were: 003 = Total Wealth; 007 = Value of Slaves Owned; 028 = Population Density in 1850; 
029 = Percentage Change in Population from 1840 to 1850; 034 = Political Party Affiliation; 227 = Serious Politician; w 
and 221 = Occupation (Cohort). -.I 
00 
w 
Acounted For Variance ·Highest Predictor Cohort Code {Law~erness} 
%Of Total· RSQ OJe Of Accounted RSQ OJo Of Accounted 
Vote RSQ Variance Var. Change For Variance Change For Variance 
056 .18943 18.9407o 028 .07604 ~.14'1o .00016 .080Jo 
057 .43015 43.0207e 034 .31022 72. 12% .00573 l.J30Jo 
058 .2;4712 24.71 Ofo 028 .12742 51.560Jo .01080 4.37% ~ 



























































































~-072 .5.5717 55.72%" 034 .40689 73 .030Jo .037 19 6067fiJo 





































078 .2028 1 20.28% 034 .07816 38.830To .03300 16.27% 
079 .15115 15. J20fo . 028 .12029 79. 58~11 .0015~ 1.050Jo 
080 . 10666 10.67% 227 .02644 24.7fWo .00710 6.66% 
08 1 .05942 • 5.94% 034 .02790 46.9j o/o .0003i .52% 
082 . 14516 14.S20Jo 034 .07060. 48.640Jo . .01503 l0.350Jo 
083 .06806 6.81% 03-4 0.04058 59.6207o .01743 25 .61 ~0 
084 .17 165 17 .17'/o 221 . 14899 86.80"/o .14899 86.800Jo 
085 .16921 16.92% 221 .05382 31.810fa .05382 31.81% 
-
086 .04661 4.66o/o 221 .01421 30.490Jo .01421 30.490'/o 
087 .15 110 15.11 07o 003 .06854 45 .36% .00707 4.68% 
088 .18624 18.62% 221 .07385 39.65% .07385 39.65 % 
089 . 16728 16.730Jo 029 .07691 45 .98% .05144 30.75% 
090 . 18459 18.46% 034 .06322 34.25% .00006 .03 0Jo 
091 .09530 9.5 3% 221 .04554 47.79% .04554 47. 79flo 
092 .15600 15.609To 221 .0~703 36.56% .05703 36.56% 
093 .22160 22. 16D7o 034 . 12085 54.540Jo .00538 2.43 % 
094 .09958 9.96% 034 .06030 60 .55% .00569 5.7 1 OJo 
095 .25771 25.77% 034 .09977 38.71% .07525 29.20% 
096 . 1211~ 12.12% 007 .051 2~ 42 .30% .00156 1.290'/o 
097 .12862 12.86% 003 .05092 39.59% .00301 2.340'/o 
098 .09485 9.49% 034 .06651 70. 12% .00557 5.870Jo 
099 .10605 10.61 % 227 .035 18 33. 170Jo .00537 5.060'/o 
tOO . 19931 19.93% 221 .046 19 23.17% .04719 23. 17% 
101 .29739 29.74% 034 .21021 70.68% .00205 .690Jo 
102 . 19560 19.56% 003 .08592 43 .92% .00670 3.43% 
103 .18276 18.28% 003 .08470 46.34% .00538 2.940'/o 





































109 . 28776 28.78% 003 . 14213 49.39% .00927 3.220Jo 
110 .38285 38.29% 003 . 18081 47 .23% .00528 1.380'/o 
Ill .35668 35.67% 034 .27333 76.63% .017 16 4.81 % 
112 .24023 24.02% 003 .07713 32. 11 % .00201 .840Jo 
113 .28041 28.04D7o 034 . 15878 56.620'/o .02620 9.340'/o 
114 . 11 855 11.86% 034 .04132 34.850'/o .00046 .390Jo 
115 .09634 9.63 % 003 .05724 59.41% .00 113 1.170'/o 
••" Votes" 68, 69, 141 , and 142 are missing because these columns of the computer were used for identification. Vote 145 
is not reported because there was not enough variance for the regression to analyze. 
0 
~ 
Acounted For Variance Highest Predictor Cohort Code (Law~erness} 
f1Jo Of Total RSQ % Of Accounted RSQ % Of Accounted 
Vote RSQ Variance Var. Change For Variance Change For Variance 
116 .30325 30.330/o 003 .13848 45.67% .00024 .08% 
117 . 10084 10.08% 034 .03702 36.7 1% .00227 2.25% ...., 
118 .1 4771 14.77% 221 .06387 43.24% .06387 43.24% ::r 





















122 . 12964 12.96% 003 .07908 61.00% .01134 8.75% ::::s 
123 .12002 12.00% 034 .06185 51.53% .00005 .04% 
~-






































~-130 .03479 3.48 % 007 .01233 35.44% .00001 .03 % ~ 
131 .03652 3.65% 029 .01881 51.51% .00709 19.41% '"t 0 
132 .06127 6.13% 028 .02959 48.29% .00000 .00% ~ 
133 .08196 8.20% 227 .037 13 45.30% .01020 12.45% V> ~. 
134 .18708 18.71% 007 .05415 28.94% . 02893 15.46% 0 
135 .04189 4.19% 028 .01424 33.99% .00117 2.79% ::::s 
136 .3057 30. 16% 034 .22497 74.60% .01095 3.63% 
137 . 17141 17. 14% 034 .09223 53.81% .00029 . 17% 
138 .09931 99.30% 070 .67876 83.40% .0846 8.52% 
139 .14734 14.73% 028 .06872 46.64% .01212 8.23% 
140 .23042 23.04% 007 .08309 36.06% .00809 3.51% 
143 .09214 9.21% 003 .04283 46.48% .00111 1.20% 
144 .25 193 25.19% 029 . 12757 50.64% .00189 .75% 
145 Not enough variance to analyze 
146 . 11687 11.690Jo 227 .04148 35.49% .00657 5.62% 
147 .25742 25.740Jo 028 . 14845 57.67% .00413 1.60% 
148 . 15215 15.22% 034 .07107 46.71% .00165 1.08% 
149 . 19873 19.87% 034 .07075 35.60% .01725 8.68% 
150 .24946 24.95% 034 . 14604 58.54% .03666 14.70% 
151 .23080 23.08% 034 .06843 29.65% .05 185 22.47% 
152 .0973 1 9.73% 034 .03604 37.04% .00196 2.01% 
153 . 10683 10.68% 034 .04929 46.14% .00004 .04% 
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168 .32943 32.94% 003 .12871 39.07% .01034 3.14% 
169 .42691 42.69% 034 .19543 45.78% .00452 1.06% 
170 .05243 5.24% 028 .02622 50.00% .00011 2.1% 
171 .20667 20.67% 029 . 11345 54.89% .00003 .0 1% 
172 . 12455 12.46% 029 .04043 32.46% .01666 13.38% 
173 .09601 9.60% 003 .05382 56.06% .00131 1.36% 
174 .05369 5.37% 028 .03 196 59.53% .00495 9.22% 
175 .27741 27.74% 007 .09020 32.52% .00365 1.32% 
176 .27260 27.26% 003 . 10738 39.39% .00511 1.87% 
177 .28063 28.06% 034 .19587 69.80% .00000 .00% ~-
NAcounted For Variance Highest Predictor Cohort Code (Law:terness) 
~ 
o/o Of Total RSQ % Of Accounted RSQ o/o Of Accounted 
Vote RSQ Variance Var . Change For Variance Change For Variance 



































































































191 .09463 9.46% 034 .03944 41.68% .01 176 12.43CVo 
(JQ 
~-192 
193 
194 
.29043 
.08106 
.28053 
29.04% 
8.11 07u 
28.05% 
034 
033 
034 
.17085 
.04691 
. 14067 
58.83% 
57 .8707o 
50.14% 
.01741 
.02076 
.03010 
5.99% 
25.61% 
10.73% 
.,..., 
0 
~ 
195 
196 
.07745 
.04704 
7.759/o 
4.70% 
034 
227 
.03378 
.02006 
43.62% 
42.64% 
.0000 1 
.00384 
.01% 
8.16% 
Ul 
Ul-· 0 
::s 
